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I. INTRODUCTION
A FULL DISCUSSION of the effects of peace in the Middle East on
trade with the United States is impossible within the constraints of a
brief article. Political and economic uncertainties in the Middle East and
the United States make some limitations in the definition of the subject
desirable. Accordingly, this article will be circumscribed in scope by the
following limiting definitions.
1. Effects. The article will deal principally with the short term ef-
fects of peace in the Middle East. In particular, it will briefly discuss the
effects of peace on those political and economic factors peculiar to the
area which presently restrain trade bltween the United States and the
Middle East and which give rise to legal problems.
2. Peace. Much of the discussion will concentrate on the Treaty of
Peace, witnessed by the United States and signed on March 26, 1979.1 On
April 25, 1979 Egypt and Israel also exchanged instruments of ratifica-
tion. The Treaty of Peace and its Annexes do not deal expressly with the
crucial Palestinian problem involving the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and
the city of Jerusalem. 2 Instead, Egypt and Israel addressed a joint letter
* A.B. (1934) Harvard College; LL.B. (1937) Harvard Law School; Adjunct Professor,
Washington and Lee Law School.
For the text of the Treaty of Peace, Annexes, and Agreed Minutes to certain articles
of the Treaty and Annexes, see 18 INT'L LEGAL MATERLALS (No. 2) 362 (Mar. 1979). For
other letters and memoranda concerning the Treaty of Peace, see id. at 530. These include
two Additional Memoranda of Agreement between the Governments of the United States of
America and the State of Israel dated March 26, 1979 which obligate the United States to
(a) take appropriate measures to promote full observance of the Treaty of Peace and (b)
supply oil to Israel under certain contingencies for a period of 15 years.
For the text of the Camp David Agreements referred to in the Treaty of Peace and
accompanying letters, see 17 INr'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1463 (1978).
2 The Gaza Strip is a narrow strip of territory bounded by the Mediterranean Sea,
Egypt and Israel. The West Bank is the area lying along the west bank of the Jordan River
which lies in the eastern part of Israel. Although the City of Jerusalem is not mentioned by
name in the Treaty of Peace or in the text of the two "Framework" documents themselves,
the letter of September 17, 1978 from Mr. Sadat to President Carter which accompanied the
"Framework Documents" stated in part "Arab Jerusalem is an integral part of the West
Bank." 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1473 (1978). On the other hand, Mr. Begin's letter to
27
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to President Carter dated March 26, 1979 which confirmed that they
would implement certain provisions included in the documents--"A
Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David" and
"Framework for the conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and
Israel"-relating to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The letter fur-
ther stated that Egypt and Israel agreed to start negotiations relative to
these matters within a month after the exchange of the instruments of
Treaty ratification. However, there are still major differences of opinion
to be settled in regard to such matters including: (a) the status of the city
of Jerusalem, (b) continued new settlements by Israelis on the West
Bank, and (c) the extent and nature of the "autonomy" to be given to the
West Bank and Gaza. At this time, it is difficult to estimate whether
Egypt and Israel will be able to come to an agreement between them-
selves on the handling of these important issues, and it is even more diffi-
cult to estimate the reaction of the other Arab countries to the hoped-for
agreement. Palestinians, Syrians and Jordanians are the Arabs most di-
rectly concerned with the solution of these problems, but all of the Arab
countries, including Egypt, are vitally interested in finding acceptable so-
lutions to these problems.
There is no specific provision in the Peace Treaty which states that
the peace is dependent upon a negotiated settlement of these vital issues.
However, it is generally believed that unless the current negotiations on
these vital issues are successful, the Treaty will fall apart.4 Moreover,
even if the Treaty itself does not fall apart, a failure to resolve these criti-
cal questions could ultimately preclude the Israeli-Egyptian goal of a
broad peaceful settlement with all the Arab countries. Thus, this article
will also touch on some of the long-term effects of the Treaty and the
Palestinian negotiations as they affect import and export trade between
the United States and the Middle East.
3. Middle East. For purposes of this article, the Middle East is
considered to embrace fifteen nations: Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jor-
dan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab
Republic, United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.), Yemen Arab Republic, and
Yemen (Aden). Iran is not included because it is frequently not consid-
ered a part of the Middle East. Moreover, trade between the United
States and Iran presents unique problems at this time due to the recent
President Carter, also dated September 17, 1978, stated that "The Government of Israel
decreed in July, 1967 that Jerusalem is one city indivisible, the Capital of the State of
Israel." 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1473 (1978).
3 18 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS (No. 2) 530 (Mar. 1979).
" Economist, Mar. 17, 1979, at 62, cols. 2,3.
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Iranian revolution and the hostage crisis. 5 Libya is included on this list
(although generally considered a part of North Africa) because it is part
of the Arab League boycott of Israel.6 This article will focus on U.S. trade
with Egypt, Israel, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and the U.A.E. These six
countries have the largest trade with the United States, and will some-
times be referred to in this article as "selected Middle Eastern Coun-
tries." In 1977, U.S. exports to these selected Middle Eastern Countries
amounted to 85.8 percent of total U.S. exports to the Middle East, and
imports from these six nations amounted to 91.2 percent of total imports
from the Middle East.7
4. Trade. As used in this article, trade will be confined to its usual
meaning - sale or transfer of products or services. Unless otherwise
noted, statistics of exports do not include military grant aid shipments,
but do include commercially financed shipments and shipments under
government financed shipments and shipments under government
financed programs such as AID and PL-480.8 The term trade encom-
passes both U.S. imports and exports. The overwhelming proportion of
U.S. imports from the Middle East consists of petroleum products. Al-
though brief references will be made to the activities of the Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), any extended discussion of
OPEC is beyond the scope of this article. In addition, no effort will be
made to discuss direct or portfolio investment.
II. THE PRESENT STATUS OF TRADE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
THE MIDDLE EAST
The following table shows U.S. exports to and imports from the se-
lected Middle Eastern Countries in 1978. Statistics for the Middle East-
ern Countries as a whole are also given.9
5 For example, the discussion of Middle Eastern Affairs in the ENCYCLOPEDIA BRIrrAN-
ICA YEARBOOK, 540-43, (1978), contains no mention of Iran. Iran is not a member of the Arab
League and it has not been at war with Israel. Much of the discussion in this article of trade
between the United States and the Middle East turns on the Arab League Boycott in the
Middle East on trade between members of the Arab League with Egypt and Israel and
between the members of the Arab League and the United States.
6 Id. The nature and duration of peace in the Middle East will have a vital effect on
trade between Libya and the United States.
7 Data taken from United States Foreign Trade Annual 1972-1978, Tables 11 and 12,
U.S. DmrT. OF COM., Ovas~m Bus. Rrr. OBR No. 79-22 (Aug. 1979).
8 Id. at Table 1.
Id. at Table 11 & 12.
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Country Imports Exports from Balance of Trade
to U.S. the U.S. ($ million)





Saudia Arabia 5,307 4,370
U.A.E. 1,858 493
Total six
countries: 11,818 9,092 (2,726)
Total Mid-
dle East:* 12,819 14,034 2,530
*Iran not included
In 1978, U.S. exports to the six selected countries represented 6.3 percent
of the total U.S. exports of $143,575 million.' 0
As the table shows, the 1978 U.S. balance of trade with these six
countries was a deficit of $2,530 million. This is a dramatic change from
the situation existing in 1972, prior to the 1973 Egyptian-Israeli war, the
ensuing oil crisis and the increasing imports of oil by the United States.
In 1972, the U.S. balance of trade with these six countries was a surplus
of $567 million. 1 During that six year period, exports from the United
States to the selected Middle Eastern Countries grew from $1,192 million
to $9,092 million, but imports from these countries to the United States
grew even more sharply - from $625 million to $11,818 million. 12
With regard to 1979, the United States Department of Commerce has
stated that the outlook for trade between the United States, the Near
East and North Africa (a broader area than the Selected Middle Eastern
Countries) is unsettled.' 3 The Department of Commerce also predicted
that "a peace settlement between Egypt and Israel would provide greater
financial resources and a more conducive climate for economic develop-
10 Id. at Table 1.
11 Id. at Table 11 & 12.
12 Id. at Table 11 & 12.
1" World Trade Outlook for Near East and North Africa, U.S. DEPT. OF COM., OVER-
sEAs Bus. RPr., OBR No. 79-09, at 3 (Apr. 1979). The U.S. Dept of Commerce uses the term
"Near East" in place of "Middle East" for purposes of foreign trade compilations. It lists
under the heading "Near East" in the United States Foreign Trade Annual 1972-78, Tables
11 and 12, all of the countries of the Middle East, as used herein, plus Iran but not Libya.
Import and export values shown are f.a.s. transactions values. It lists under the heading
"North Africa (other than Egypt)" Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and three countries
with much smaller imports and exports.
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ment in both countries. '14 However, this prediction was made prior to the
strong negative reaction of the other Arab League members to the Egyp-
tian-Israeli Peace Treaty."6
In the largest Arab market, Saudi Arabia, United States suppliers
account for the largest percentage of imported goods. United States sup-
pliers also lead in Israel and Egypt with the latter often being considered
the largest potential Arab market."6 They rank second or third in Kuwait
and the U.A.E. 11 Entirely apart from the strategic importance of the oil
produced by the Middle East, the Middle East is clearly an area of great
importance to the export trade of the United States.
A. Background to the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of Peace
The establishment of Israel as an independent state in 1948-49,
brought a constant state of turmoil to the Middle East. Since Israel's in-
dependence, four major wars have been fought between Israel and the
Arab nations of the Middle East. In all of those wars, Egypt was the prin-
cipal Arab country involved. In terms of population,'8 military strength
and technical skills, Egypt is superior to the other Arab countries. In
fact, until the recent peace negotiations, Egypt was the leader of the Arab
world, with the headquarters of the Arab League located in Cairo.
Prior to Egypt's recognition of Israel by signing the Treaty of Peace,
no Arab country had ever recognized the existence of the State of Israel.
Moreover, almost all the Arab countries have regarded themselves as in a
continuing state of war with Israel.20 The cost in human lives and de-
struction of property has been tremendous. 21
In the spring of 1979, Senator Church of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee requested Secretary of State Vance to furnish an esti-
14 Id.
15 Note 1 supra and related text.
,6 Lill, U.S.-Arab Commerce, MMDLE EAST EcON. DIG. 7 (March 2, 1979).
17 Id.
18 Feige, Economic Consequences of Peace in the Middle East, CHALLENGE 5 (Jan.-Feb.
1979) at 9.
19 Middle East Peace Package: Hearings on S. 1007 Before the Senate Comm. on For-
eign Relations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Middle
East Peace Package].
20 The Arab position is that the truces and ceasefires which brought active hostilities to
a halt in each of these conflicts did not constitute a peace so that the state of war continued.
HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATION OF THE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOR-
EIGN COMMERCE, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., REPORT ON THE ARAB BoYcor AN AMERICAN Busi-
NESS 85 (Subcomm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as "Moss REPORT"].
11 125 CONG. REC. S5175 (daily ed. May 2, 1979) former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
estimated in an April 3, 1979 letter to Senator Frank Church that there have been some
115,000 Arab and 40,000 Israeli military casualties since 1948, in addition to heavy
Jordanian and Lebanese internal casualties.
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mate of the cost to the United States of the four wars between Israel and
the Middle Eastern countries during the period of 1948 to 1978. Secretary
Vance's letter of April 23, 1979 emphasized the difficulty of quantifying
the financial cost of these four wars to the United States, but set the
estimated cost to the United States at between $55 billion and $70
billion.22
Both Egypt and Israel spend a tremendous portion of their gross do-
mestic product on military expenditures-in 1977, 27.6 percent for Egypt
and 29.4 percent for Israel.23 These percentages may be compared to six
percent for the United States and two percent for most developing na-
tions.24 Yet, other Middle Eastern governments spend equally large per-
centages of their total budgets for military purposes. Defense comprises
approximately 24.4 percent of the Saudi Arabian budget for 1979-80 (in-
cluding special projects) and 28.8 percent of that budget (excluding spe-
cial projects).2 5
The United States is a principal supplier of arms to various Middle
Eastern countries. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report on
22 Id. at 175-76. Secretary of State Vance's estimate of the financial costs to the United
States is broken down as follows (in billions of dollars):
U.S. contribution to U.N.
Refugee Agency for persons displaced
By Middle East wars 
.8
U.S. share of cost of U.N. peace-
keeping forces 
.3
Military assistance to Israel
(over the 30 year period) 9.9
Military assistance to Jordan
(over the 30 year period) .39
Promotion of economic stability
direct economic assistance
to Middle Eastern countries 13.0
Replacement of Israeli battle-
field losses in 1973 war
(grant funds) 2.2
Cost to U.S. economy of oil
embargo of 1973-74 15.0
Cumulative cost of increased
oil prices to U.S. since
1973-74 estimated at $300
billion; attributing 5% or
10% of this amount to 1973
war, the effect is 15.0 minimun
30.0 maximum
56.59 minimum
71.59 maximum2 Feige, supra note 18, at 6.
24 Id. at 7.
2" MIDDLE EAST ECON. DIG., (June 1, 1979), at 40.
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the International Security Assistance Act of 19782' discussed the new pol-
icy of "arms transfer restraint" announced by President Carter on May
19, 1977. The Committee Report stated that about $19.4 billion worth of
arms transfer proposals had been transmitted formally and informally to
Congress in less than one year after announcing the President's arms pol-
icy. Among those transfers were the following:
2 7
Israel $2.3 billion




If the transfer to Iran ($6.9 billion) were included, the total transfers to
these five countries, $15.1 billion, would constitute 77.8 percent of the
total United States arms transfer proposals referred to above.
B. Special Political Factors Affecting Trade between the United States
and the Middle East.
There are three crucial political factors affecting trade: (1) the ten-
sion between Israel and the Arab countries, (2) the special relationship
between Israel and the United States, and (3) the Arab League Boycott of
Israel. Moreover, one must consider the panoply of U.S. legislation, regu-
lations and administrative proceedings which affect this trade. In
particular:
(1) The anti-boycott amendments to the Export Administration Act
adopted in 1977,28 and the related regulations;29
(2) The anti-boycott amendment to the Tax Reform Act of 1976,30 and
its related regulations;-1
(3) Proceedings under the U.S. antitrust acts against U.S. exporters
who comply with the Arab League boycott demands;3
26 S. REP. No. 841, 95th Cong., 2d Seas., 9 (1978).
27 Id.
2'8 Export Administration Amendments Act 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2403-1a, 2403a, 2404-
2407, (1976 & Supp. I 1977).
2 Restrictive Trade Practice or Boycotts, 15 C.F.R. § 369 (1979), at 264. Under regula-
tions effective January 18, 1978, agreements entered into on or before May 16, 1977 had
until December 31, 1978 to come into compliance. Provisions were included for further ex-
tensions on a case by case basis through December 31, 1979. See § 369.5.
30 I.R.C. §§908, 999, 952 (a) (3), 995 (b) (1) (F) (ii).
," Temp. Rule, Treas. Reg. § 7.999-(1)(C), T.D. 7467, (1977), Computation of the inter-
national boycott factor; Prop. Tress. Reg. § 1.999-1 (b) (1977) which deals with loss of tax
benefit.
22 See, e.g., United States v. Bechtel Corp., 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
E-1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-4194 (9th Cir. May 29, 1979).
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(4) The usual export controls under the Export Administration Act 33
which apply to all exports of U.S. origin equipment to any country; and
(5) The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act which also applies to U.S. ex-
ports to all countries.3 4
Each of these trade provisions affect trade between the United
States and the Middle East. Factors (4) and (5) listed above will not be
altered by the Treaty on Peace or any general settlement of Mideast
problems. Theoretically, however, if a broad peaceful settlement were
reached, the Arab boycott of Israel would disappear and with it the ne-
cessity of complying with the statutes and regulations under (1), (2), and
(3).
C. The Arab League Boycott
The Arab League Boycott 5 has already been the subject of much
literature. This section will survey the historical origin of the Arab
League Boycott, the identity of the boycotting countries prior to the
Peace Treaty, the general nature and application of the Boycott, the ef-
fect of the Arab League Boycott on trade between the United States and
the Middle East, and the effect of the anti-boycott legislation of the
United States on the Middle East.
The origin of the Arab League Boycott dates to 1945, shortly after
the founding of the Arab League." At that time the League consisted of
seven countries: Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia
and Yemen. By 1974, the League had grown to nineteen nations: Algeria,
Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Mo-
rocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunsia, the
U.A.E., and Yemen (Aden), plus the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO).37
The Yemen Arab Republic later became a member of the Arab
League and Iran (although not a member of the Arab League) announced
on January 11, 1979, that it would no longer supply oil to Israel.3 8 Egypt
is currently suspended from membership.3 9
3' Export Administration Amendments Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2403 (1976 & Supp. I
1977).
3' Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd, 78dd-2 (1977).
31 See, e.g., The Arab Boycott: The Antitrust Challenge of United States v. Bechtel, 92
HARv. L. REv. 1440 (1979); Turk, The Arab Boycott of Israel, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 472 (1977);
Marcus, Arab Boycott Law - The Regulation of International Business Behavior, 8 GA. J.
INT'L L. AND CoMP. L. 559 (1978).
11 Moss REPORT, supra note 20 at 10.
37 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRrrTANICA MICROPEDIA 470 (1974).
38 ECONOMIST, Jan. 20, 1979, at 52, col. 1
39 ECONOMIST, Apr. 7, 1979, at 64, col. 1 and related text.
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D. The Nature of the Boycott
The Arab League Boycott operates at three different levels. On the
first level, the boycotting Arab countries refuse to deal commercially with
the State of Israel and its nationals or to import Israeli products. On the
second level, the boycotting countries refuse to deal with non-Israeli com-
panies or individuals who support the economy of Israel or its military
effort. On the third level, there is what is sometimes called the secondary
boycott in which certain Arab States refuse to do business with those
firms or individuals which do not themselves support the economy of
Israel or strengthen its military efforts but which do business with other
companies who support the economy of Israel or strengthen its war ef-
fort.40 This article will deal primarily with the effect of the secondary
boycott on U.S. exports to the Middle East. The primary boycott (affect-
ing trade between the boycotting countries and Israel) does not have a
direct effect on trade between the United States and the Middle Eastern
countries, although it may well have some indirect effect on U.S. trade
with Israel. The tertiary (or extended secondary boycott) will not be dis-
cussed in this article as it is not believed to be a substantial factor bear-
ing upon the trade of the United States.
Although reference will be made to the Arab League Boycott or to
the boycott of Israel by the Arab countries, not all of the members of the
Arab League apply the boycott to the same extent. For example, six Mos-
lem countries (Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan and Tuni-
sia) apply the primary boycott, i.e., they do not permit importation of
Israeli goods, but they do not apply the secondary or tertiary boycott.41
U.S. legislation is not intended to reach the primary boycott since
this is a matter between the Arab states and Israel. A primary boycott it
accepted, under international law, as a legitimate measure for one coun-
try to use against another hostile or enemy country.42 Indeed, the United
States has maintained economic boycotts against various foreign coun-
tries ever since World War ]l. 43
Section 999(a)(3) of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 requires that a pub-
lic listing of the Arab Boycott countries be made quarterly by the Depart-
ment of the Treasury. As of January 2, 1979 the Department listed the
following as countries boycotting Israel: Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan,
Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudia Arabia, Syria, the U.A.E.,
and the Yemens.44 Note that the six countries applying only the primary
boycott referred to above are not included on this list.
40 Moss REPORT, supra note 20 at 1.
41 Turk, supra note 35 at 472-475.
42 Moss REPORT, supra note 20 at 9, 10.
43 Id. at 9.
" 10 FED. TAX REP. (CCH) §6401 (1979); 1979-7 LR.B. 31.
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In order to consider the effect of the secondary boycott on U.S. ex-
ports to the Middle East it is important to discuss, in general terms, the
nature and extent of the secondary boycott. The boycott of Israel is ad-
ministered by the Head Office for the Boycott of Israel in Damascus,
Syria. It published the General Principles for Boycott of Israel [herein
after cited as Boycott Rules] in 1972."' The Boycott Rules are complex,
and their frequent amendment results in considerable confusion over
their interpretation and application. Article 15 of the Boycott Rules" is
the key provision. There are four major points in its application:
(1) The secondary boycott applies only to companies (private or
public) which "support the economy of Israel, develop its indus-
try, or increase the efficiency of its military effort. '47
(2) No general principle is laid down as to foreign arms plants
that supply Israel with arms or ammunition. Each case is to be
considered separately.48 Clearly the various Arab states wish to be
free to import arms from whatever source seems most desirable,
regardless of connections with Israel.
(3) The Boycott Rules49 prohibit any freight-carrying ship from
calling on Israeli and Arab ports on the same round trip, thus
presumably raising freight costs for Israel while blacklisting cer-
tain foreign ships.
(4) The administration of the Boycott Rules is far from uniform.
The governments of some Arab countries have blithely considered
the Boycott Rules not applicable where the government itself is
the importer. The Moss Report states that "[A] review of Export
Administration Act reports confirms that some firms listed on the
Arab blacklist are still able to do business with Arab countries." 50
The first of these four points requires further analysis. The language
of the Boycott Rules is general, but Article 15 lists examples of activities
of foreign companies which would fall within the ban:51
(1) Establishing a plant in Israel;
(2) Establishing an assembly plant in Israel (including assembly
plants in Israel established by the agents of foreign companies);
(3) Maintaining general agents or head offices for the Middle
East in Israel;
'5 Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy: Hearings on Politi-
cal and Financial Consequences of the OPEC Price Increases Before the Subcomm. on
Multinational Corporations of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 11, at 442 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on OPEC].
46 Id. at 449.
,7 Moss REPORT, supra note 20 at 86.
48 Hearings on OPEC, supra note 45 at 469.
, Id. at 461.
50 Moss REPORT, supra note 20 at 38.
51 Hearings on OPEC, supra note 45, at 449-50.
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(4) Granting to Israeli companies the right to use their name or
trademark;
(5) Becoming partners in Israeli companies or manufacturing
plants;
(6) Supplying advice or technical assistance to Israeli manufac-
turing plants;
(7) Refusing to reply to questions from the boycott authorities
as to their relations to Israel; and
(8) Importing goods from Israel (but with substantial
exceptions).
Thus arguably the sale of commercial goods to Israel (if not used in
its military effort) does not violate the Boycott unless it is coupled with
one of the actions described in paragraphs (1) through (6) above. Simi-
larly, the import of goods from Israel does not violate the Boycott if the
importation is for sale within the country in which the importing com-
pany has its headquarters and the importing company has not "persist-
ently refused" to offer Arab products for sale.
52
Although the range of proscribed actions set forth in paragraphs (1)
to (6) above includes some actions which are frequently associated with
the export of goods, there is indeed some justification for the statement of
the Commissioner General for the Arab League Boycott that, "[I]f it
turns out that these relations (i.e., the relations between the foreign
company and Israel) do not go beyond pure ordinary business relations,
the matter is over and dealings with such companies are not restricted. '85
Similarly, Secretary of Commerce Morton testified before the Subcom-
mittee on Oversight and Investigations on September 22, 1975 as follows,
"[I]n fact, a U.S. firm trading with Arab countries may very well be trad-
ing with Israel as well, since the Arab boycott list .does not extend to U.S.
firms engaging in routine trading with Israel" (emphasis added)."
Before considering the effects of the boycott on U.S. trade with the
Middle East, it is useful to examine its method of operation. The control
of imports into the Arab countries is usually handled either by the gov-
ernment agency issuing import licenses (if an import licensing system is
in effect) or by the customs authorities (if no import licensing system ex-
ists in the given country). The boycott mechanism provides for the publi-
cation and maintenance of extensive lists of foreign companies whose
products are proscribed in order to guide import licensing authorities and
customs authorities.5 5 A separate list is published for each foreign coun-
try. Each list includes not only the names of the parent companies but
52 Id. at 450.
53 Moss REPORT, supra note 20 at 86 (Letter of August 31, 1975 from Mohammed
Mahgoub, Commissioner General of Central Office for the Boycott of Israel, to District
Committee No. 12, Nat. Assn., Securities Dealers, Inc.).
Id. at 15.
85 Hearings on OPEC, supra note 45 at 371.
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also the names of its affiliated companies and of the trademarks used by
these companies (commonly referred to as "the blacklist"). Each Arab
country publishes its own lists which are revised from time to time to
reflect companies added or deleted. Copies of the list are not widely dis-
tributed but a copy of the "Directory of Boycotted Foreign Companies
and Establishments-United States of America" published by the Cham-
ber of Commerce and Industries of Saudi Arabia is included in the record
of Senate Hearings on OPEC.56 The list is sixty-seven pages long with
approximately twenty-five items per page, for a total of roughly 1500
items. However, one can easily be misled by this figure into overestimat-
ing the total number of concerns on the blacklist. For example, R.C.A. is
on the list along with thirty-three items relating to R.C.A. including the
names of various affiliated companies which occupy two full pages of the
list.57 Similarly, Hertz is on the list, with eleven items relating to Hertz
and its affiliates." Thus the number of parent companies on the list is
much smaller than 1500. Another more realistic approach is the calcula-
tion of the proportion of the companies which appear in the 1978 Fortune
List of 500 Largest United States Industrial Corporations and which also
appear on the blacklist.59 Checking the names of the fifty largest compa-
nies and the fifty smallest companies on Fortune's list, only about five
percent of the 100 companies checked were on the boycott blacklist.60
Moreover, as pointed out above, the fact that a company's name is on the
blacklist does not necessarily mean that the boycott countries import
none of its products.
The net result of extensive investigations carried out by the Moss
Committee as to the quantitative effect of the boycott on U.S. trade with
the Middle East is that the boycott has had a fairly substantial effect on
United States trade with the Middle East, although that effect is impossi-
ble to quantify precisely.6' The boycott has affected U.S. exports to the
Middle East in several ways. First, it undoubtedly has had some effect on
5 Id. at 374-441.
"7 Id. at 427-29.
'8 Id. at 401-02.
FORTUNE, May 7, 1979, at 270.
60 Id. These companies included Coca Cola Corporation, Ford Motor Company, Mon-
santo, RCA and Xerox.
61 Moss REPORT, supra note 20 at 41. The Moss Report discusses the impact of the
boycott on U.S. export trade under the headings "Economic Analyses of Trade Data" and
"Impact on Domestic Firms," at 35 and 41, respectively. The only instance of a quantified
impact on export sales cited in the Moss Report is with respect to exports of RCA, at 41:
An RCA executive told the subcommittee that prior to being placed on the
"blacklist," RCA did approximately $10 million worth of business annually with
Arab countries. RCA, the subcommittee was told, had every reason to believe that
its sales to these companies would increase above the $10 million figure. Since
being blacklisted, its annual sales to the same countries have dropped to less than
$9 million, a direct loss of over $1 million annually.
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U.S. exports to Israel, since some American companies may have elected
to forego the Israeli market in order not to harm their exports to the
Arab countries. It has also had an undoubted effect on those U.S. firms
whose names are on the blacklist because of trade with Israel. Of course,
to establish what U.S. exports to the Middle East might have been with-
out the boycott is an impossible task. The data submitted by exporting
firms pursuant to the Export Administration Act's reporting require-
ments from 1969 to 1977 certainly did not attempt to provide this
information.
62
IlI. EFFECT OF THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT AMENDMENTs OF 1977
ON UNITED STATES TRADE WITH THE MIDDLE EAST. 63
As previously noted U.S. trade with the Middle East grew sharply
after the oil embargo and the increase in petroleum prices. The impact of
this sharp increase in trade caused the Arab League Boycott to become
an even more controversial subject in the United States.' In its report on
the Export Administration Amendments of 1977, the Senate Committee
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs commented as follows:65
The increase in boycott demands by the Arab States reflects contin-
ued political tensions in the Middle East and the dramatically enhanced
economic power of the oil-producing states since the oil embargo of 1973.
Increased petroleum prices and the accumulation of oil earnings have sig-
nificantly changed the dimensions of the boycott. Its power and reach
promise to grow as trade and investment with the West expand. As they
do, the pressure on United States firms to comply with the boycott if
they wish to do business with the Arab States will undoubtedly grow as
well.
Opponents of the boycott launched an intensive drive to broaden the U.S.
legislation so that those companies complying with the boycott (subject to
certain exceptions) would be in violation of U.S. law and subject to crimi-
nal penalities.6
6
The 1977 EAA Report makes a clear distinction between the primary
boycott and the secondary and tertiary boycotts:67
62 Export Administration Amendments Act, 50 U.S.C. App. §§2406 (1976 & Supp. I
1977); Moss REPORT, supra note 20 at 76.
11 Export Administration Amendments Act, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2402, 2403, 2403-1a,
2403a, 2404-2407, 2409, 2410, 2411a, 2412, 2413 (1976 & Supp. I 1977).
" SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRs, EXPORT ADMINISTRATION
AMENDMENTS OF 1977, S. REP. No. 104, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
1977 EAA REPORT].
02 Id. at 63.
6 Id. at 22-24.
6 Id. at 21.
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The committee is aware that primary boycotts are a common, al-
though regrettable, form of international conflict and that there are se-
vere limitations on the ability of outside parties to bring such boycotts to
an end. However, the committee strongly believes that the United States
should not acquiesce in attempts by foreign governments through secon-
dary and tertiary boycotts to embroil American citizens in their battles
against others by forcing them to participate in actions which are repug-
nant to American values and traditions.
The Committee noted that there were potential dangers in enacting legis-
lation of this type which, unless very carefully drafted, could seriously
alienate the Arab countries and cause even greater turmoil in the Middle
East: 8
The committee also recognizes that such legislation, however well in-
tentioned, could unjustly interfere with the sovereignty of others and
thus violate the very principle which this bill seeks to establish. More-
over, legislation which fails to recognize the political sensitivities of the
Arab States themselves, most of which are as jealous of their prerogatives
as the United States is of its own, could erode U.S. influence in the Arab
world and undermine efforts toward peace. Given the reality of the
world's dependence on Arab oil, a breakdown in those efforts would be
dangerous in the extreme and could trigger a backlash which ultimately
harms the very interests this legislation seeks in part to protect. And
antiboycott legislation which prolongs the conflict in the Middle East
could paradoxically prolong the boycott which this bill seeks to address.
As a result of this delicate balance of interests the Export Adminis-
tration Amendments of 1977 required the issuance of rules and regula-
tions prohibiting69 any U.S. citizen, with respect to his activities in inter-
state or foreign commerce of the United States, from taking certain
specified actions70 with intent to comply with any boycott imposed by a
foreign country against a country friendly to the United States. At the
same time, the Act created certain exceptions7 1 to these prohibitions. It
was believed that much of the export trade of the United States to the
Arab countries would fall within these exceptions. Generally, the prohibi-
tions are broadly phrased, and the exceptions narrowly phrased. Even
with the help of the Commerce Department regulations, it is difficult for
an exporting company to be sure that its acts fall within the exceptions so
as to avoid violating the law.
Almost all persons or concerns testifying in regard to the Export Ad-
I8 /d.
Export Administration Amendments Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2403-1a (a) (1) (1976 &
Supp. 1977).
70 Id. at § 2403-1a (a)(1)(A)-(F).
1 Id. at §2403-1a (a)(2).
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ministration Amendments of 1977 were opposed to the secondary and ter-
tiary boycott in principle.72 However, exporters were generally critical of
the legislation as originally proposed because it would severely prejudice
U.S. exports to the Arab countries, vis a vis foreign exports, not handi-
capped by similar legislation. Foreign companies would be in a more
favorable position than U.S. exporters and would thereby obtain a larger
share of the Arab market.73 This in turn would work to the disadvantage
of the U.S. balance of payments.
The legislative compromise which embodied the most controversial
aspects of the Export Administration Amendments of 1977 was worked
out in protracted negotiations between the private parties supporting and
opposing the proposed legislation. Congress accepted and enacted the es-
sence of the compromise agreed to by these parties.74
A separate legislative drive, spearheaded by Senator Jackson, re-
sulted in an amendment to the Tax Reform Act of 1976 which, in effect,
imposed tax penalties on those concerns which failed to comply with the
anti-boycott provisions of the amendment.7 5 Unfortunately, although the
amendments to the Tax Reform Act of 1976 relating to the boycott"6 deal
with precisely the same problem as that covered by Export Administra-
tion Amendments of 1977, 7 the legislation does not deal with the prob-
lem in the same terms. In certain respects the two pieces of legislation are
inconsistent. Furthermore, two different administrative agencies (Com-
merce and Treasury) are charged with administering the two acts. Conse-
quently, some of the activities permitted under the Export Administra-
tion Amendments of 1977 are in violation of the amendments to the Tax
Reform Act.7 8 For example,79 it is legal under the Export Administration
Act of 1977 and the Commerce Department regulations for a U.S. ex-
porter to agree to comply generally with a country's laws without any
specific reference to the boycott laws.80 However, under the Treasury De-
partment guidelines, this is deemed to be an agreement to participate in a
boycott.81
712 1977 EAA REPORT, supra note 64.
71 Id. at 23.
71 Id. at 78 (additional views of Senator Stevenson).
75 I.R.C. §§908, 952 (a)(3), 995(B)(1)(F)(ii).
78 Id.
77Export Administration Amendments Act, 50 U.S.C. App. §§2402, 2403, 2403-1a,
2403a, 2404-2407, 2409, 2410, 2411a, 2412, 2413 (1976 & Supp. I 1977).
78 251 INT'L TRADE REP. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) (0-1) - (0-2). Testimony of Stanley
Marcus of the U.S. Dept. of Commerce relating to the operations of the Export Administra-
tion Amendments of 1977 before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
[hereinafter cited as ITEX].
11 Id. at (0-1).
11 Export Administration Amendments Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2403-la(a)(2)(F) (1976 &
Supp. I 1977).8 I.R.C. § 999(b).
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The Export Administrations Amendments Act of 1977 became effec-
tive on December 31, 1977, but the regulations provided a grace period
until December 31, 1978 with respect to written agreements entered into
before May 17, 1977.82 No estimate has been found as to the number of
contracts affected by this grace period, but it probably applies to many
major long-term contracts, such as construction projects extending over a
period of years.
It is reasonably clear, however, that the boycott and the U.S. legisla-
tive response to it has had an impact. It has complicated the administra-
tive work load of the U.S. exporter who must comply with both the re-
quirements of the boycott authorities and of the U.S. government. It has
also interjected an issue of almost explosive intensity into the relations
between the Jewish community in the United States and the U.S. export-
ers to the Middle East.8 3 A result of the combined effects of these factors
may be to discourage a certain number of U.S. exporters from attempting
any exports to the Middle East, whether to Israel or to the Arab
countries.
Despite the boycott countries general bitterness toward the U.S. gov-
ernment interference with the Arab reaction to the Israeli problem, all of
the Boycott countries have made some accommodation to assist U.S.
companies in complying with the U.S. legislation."'
Under the tertiary boycott some of the Arab countries sought to re-
quire exporting concerns to agree not to deal with other foreign concerns
who violated the secondary boycott. In more concrete terms, if a U.S.
Company A had agreed to manufacture fighter planes for Israel, an Arab
country might request that other U.S. companies B and C (who wished to
export unrelated goods to the Arab country in question) not use compo-
nents obtained from Company A in the goods to be exported by compa-
nies B and C to the Arab country in question. This type of restraint
seemed to have a clear effect on the domestic commerce of the United
States, and as indicated above, this was a principal concern of Congress
in adopting the 1977 Amendments to the Export Administration Act.
5
82 Export Administration Amendments Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2403-1a(a)(5) (1976 &
Supp. I 1977).
11 Anti-Boycott Law Creates Confusion, MIDDLE EAST ECON. DIG. (March 16, 1979), at
15.
84 Almost all boycotting countries accept a positive certificate of origin (i.e., the goods
shipped are of United States origin), which is acceptable under the Export Administration
Amendments of 1977, instead of the so-called negative certificate of origin (i.e., the goods
are not of Israeli origin), which was previously required by a number of the boycotting coun-
tries. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have modified their requirements in an effort
to make the certifications requested coincide with the permitted exceptions under the 1977
EAA Amendments. See, 50 U.S.C. App. §§2402, 2403, 2403-1a, 2403a, 2404-2407, 2409, 2410,
2411a, 2412, 2413, (1976 & Supp. 1 1977); MIDDLE EAST ECON. DIG., supra note 83, at 16.
85 1977 EAA REPORT, supra note 64.
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The United States Justice Department also took the position that the
tertiary boycott in some cases violated the U.S. antitrust laws.86 The An-
titrust Division was successful in obtaining a consent decree against one
company, the Bechtel Corporation.8 7
The effect that these two pieces of legislation and the Bechtel ligita-
tion have had on exports from the United States to the Middle East must
be examined. Despite the dire predictions of critics, exports to the Boy-
cott countries increased in 1978. Probably the clearest official U.S. Gov-
ernment statement on this point is the testimony of Stanley Marcus of
the Commerce Department regarding the Export Act's anti-boycott provi-
sions. "I believe," said Marcus, that:
... we have been successful in fulfilling the antiboycott goals of Con-
gress while minimizing the impact on United States exports. In the year
since the regulations became effective, United States exports to the boy-
cotting countries of the Middle East rose 18%. To Saudi Arabia they
have grown by 22%; to Kuwait, by 36%. So clearly the impact on our
trade has not been disastrous as some predicted it would.
On the other hand a number of business transactions have undoubt-
edly failed because United States companies have been unable to comply
with boycott demands. Our information on this source is largely anecdo-
tal, however. There is no way to secure an accurate measure of the trans-
actions that have not been attempted or have failed because of conflicts
between American law and boycott requirements. Overall, however, we
are encouraged by the fact that major conflicts have been avoided and
our trade with the Middle East continues to grow.88
However, it is claimed with some justification that because of the
grace period referred to above, 9 the full impact of the anti-boycott legis-
lation will only become fully apparent in 1979 or perhaps 1980.90
IV. PEACE TREATY PROVISIONS RELATING TO ECONOMIC AND TRADE
MATTERS.
Article I (3) of the Treaty of Peace91 provides that upon completion
of the interim withdrawal, the Parties will establish normal and friendly
relations in accordance with Article III (3). Article I1 (3) provides that
this normal relationship will include full economic relations and the ter-
"See note 32, supra.
87 Id.
88 ITEX, supra note 78, at (0-1).
9' Export Administration Amendments Act, 50 U.S.C. App. §2403-la(a)(5) (1976 &
Supp. I 1977).
'o MIDDLE EAST ECON. DIG., supra note 83, at 15.
91 INTL LEGAL MATERIALS, supra note 1, at 363.
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mination of economic boycotts. Annex III of the Treaty sets out the pro-
cess by which Egypt and Israel undertake to achieve such a relationship.92
In Article 2 of Annex III, the parties agree, upon completion of the "in-
terim withdrawal,"9 3 to terminate all economic boycotts of each other and
to negotiate an agreement on trade and commerce as soon as possible and
not later than six months after the withdrawal.
Thus, for example, if the preliminary withdrawal is completed at the
latest date specified in the treaty (i.e., nine months after ratification of
the treaty) economic boycotts must be terminated no later than January
25, 1980. Of course, Egypt may well elect to terminate its boycott at an
earlier date, and indications are that this is in fact taking place; at least
in part and on a de facto basis.9 4
Other provisions of Annex III deal with the free movement of per-
sons and vehicles between Egypt and Israel to be effective upon comple-
tion of the interim withdrawal," and with transportation and telecommu-
nications between the two countries.96 The Agreed Minutes to Annex I
specify that normal economic relations between the parties will also in-
clude normal commercial sales of oil by Egypt to Israel.e7
Article V of the Treaty, relating to the use of the Suez Canal to the
Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aquaba,s and Article 8 of Annex III,
relating to right of passage through territorial seas,99 became effective
upon ratification of the Treaty. These provisions were not tied to the
completion of the preliminary withdrawal.10 0 Article V (1) of the Treaty
of Peace contains important provisions relative to movement of ships and
cargoes. Those relating to the Suez Canal are of particular importance to
Israel,"" because Israeli ships and cargoes bound for or coming from
92 Id. at 389.
3 Article II of the Appendix to Annex 1 to the Treaty provides that the preliminary
withdrawal is to be completed within nine months from the date of exchange of instruments
of ratification, i.e. on or before January 26, 1980. Id. at 362.
", Things go better for (Coca Cola), MIDDLE EAST ECON. DIG., (July 20, 1979) at 20. As
pointed out above, Egypt's obligation under the Peace Treaty to terminate all economic
boycotts of Israel becomes operative only upon completion of the interim withdrawal, but
Egypt is apparently lifting its secondary boycott on at least some of the American compa-
nies before the interim withdrawal is completed. Egypt is also lifting the boycott ban on at
least some English companies. UK Company Follows Coca Cola, MIDDLE EAST EcON. DIG.,
(Aug. 10, 1979), at 18.
:5 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS, supra note 1 at 389.
96 Id. at 390.
:7 Id. at 393.
9 Id. at 365.
9' Id. at 391.
Id. at 365, 391.
101 Id. at 365. This paragraph provides that ships of Israel and cargoes destined for or
coming from Israel shall enjoy right of free passage through the Suez Canal and its ap-
Vol. 12:27
EFFECTS OF PEACE ON U.S. TRADE
Israel were unable to use the Suez Canal for many years. Such provisions
relate primarily to relations between Egypt and Israel but they will also
have important effects on trade between these countries and the United
States.
A. United States Actions and Agreements Supportive of the Treaty of
Peace
The United States is not a party to the Peace Treaty; President
Carter signed the Treaty and the Agreed Minutes only as a witness. How-
ever, six Treaty-related documents approved by Congress, obligate the
United States in various ways.102
Three of these documents in particular will have an important effect
on trade with Egypt and Israel. The first is the United States-Israeli
Agreements on the construction and funding of air bases.103 Second, in a
letter from Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to Egypt, the United
States obligated itself to sales over a three year period'0 ' of military
equipment and services to Egypt. These sales are valued up to $1.5 billion
- this amount to be financed by FMS (Foreign Military Security) credits
of up to $500,000,000 a year. Finally, in a letter from Secretary Brown to
Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Weizman, the United States promised to
help Israel relocate its Sinai Military facilities to the Negev and to make
possible additional military equipment purchases of $3 billion with $800
million in grants and the balance in loans.103
The third document, the extension of a 1975 agreement between the
United States and Israel, may also have an effect on trade between the
United States, Israel and Egypt. In this document the United States
agrees to a ten year extension of its previous five year commitment to
supply Israel with its oil requirement at world market prices should Israel
be unable to obtain its oil from other sources (the fifteen year period
starts only when Israel makes its first call on the United States under the
agreement).' The other pertinent documents are the Israel and United
proaches on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888, applying to all nationals. It
further provides for nondiscriminatory treatment in matters relating to the usage of the
Canal for Israeli nationals, vessels and cargoes as well as persons, vessels and cargoes des-
tined for or coming from Israel.
102 Hearings on Middle East Peace Package, supra note 19, at 139-182.
103 Id. at 152-179.
104 Id. at 182.
"05 Id. at 180.
106 Israel has made no call on the United States under the 1975 agreement so that the
fifteen year life of the commitment has not begun to run. Id. at 17, 54-55. For years, Israel
has relied on Iran for approximately 50% or more of its oil. On January 11, 1979, the Bakh-
tiar government of Iran banned the export of oil to Israel. ECONOMIST, supra note 38. This
action by Iran makes Egypt's commitment to sell oil to Israel a matter of substantial impor-
tance to the United States.
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States Memorandum on assurances as well as letters from President
Carter to President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin regarding consulta-
tions, aerial monitoring and permanent stationing of United Nations per-
sonnel in the limited force zone.107
Pursuant to the above undertakings, the Administration recom-
mended to Congress that it provide special assistance to Egypt and Israel
(in addition to the aid provided for these countries by the International
Security Assistance Act of 1978).108 To place this special assistance in
proper perspective, it should be noted that (exclusive of this special assis-
tance), United States assistance to Israel had averaged annually approxi-
mately $1050 million in grants and $775 million in loans in the fiscal
years 1977, '78 and '79.109 Similarly, United States assistance to Egypt
also had been running at high levels in recent years; it amounted annually
to approximately $1 billion ($750 million in economic support funds and
$250 million in PL-480 aid). 110 At the hearings on the Middle East Peace
Package, former Secretary Vance testified that the Administration ex-
pected that "normal" aid to Egypt and Israel would continue at about
these levels."'
The Special International Security Assistance Act of 1979 provides a
three-year program involving $4,800 million to assist Egypt and Israel in
implementing the Peace Treaty."12
Military
Israel base construction $800 million
Israel (other redeployment) $2,200 million
Egypt military assistance $1,500 million





Of these total amounts, $1.0 billion would be made available by grants,
$3.7 billion would be available for Foreign Military Security loans at mar-
ket rates of interest, and $0.1 billion by concessional loans." 3
"' INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS, supra note 1, at 532, 536.
108 Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1979, Pub. L. No.
95-481, §1, 92 Stat. 159.
109 For a detailed recapitulation of aid extended by the United States to Israel over the
years 1949-1979, See Hearings on Middle East Peace Package, supra note 102, at 183-84.
110 Id. at 22.
Id at 53.
112 S. REP. No. 113, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979).
113 Despite the provisions of the act that much of this aid is to be furnished on a loan
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B. Reaction of The Other Arab States to the Peace Treaty
The immediate reaction of the other Arab states and the PLO to the
Peace Treaty was strongly adverse. At a meeting in Baghdad on March
31, 1979, the PLO and the eighteen Arab states attending the conference
unanimously adopted the following political and economic resolutions.
111
(1) Political measures:
(a) to withdraw immediately all Arab ambassadors,
(b) to cut off political and diplomatic relations,
(c) to suspend Egypt's membership in the Arab League,
(d) to transfer temporarily the League's headquarters to Tuni-
sia, and
(d) to suspend Egypt's membership in all inter-Arab
organizations.
(2) Economic measures:
(a) to cut off loans, deposits, guarantees, bonds, contributions
(financial, material or technical) to the Egyptian
government;
(b) to ban economic aid given by Arab funds, banks and
financial establishments;
(c) to refrain from purchasing Egyptian government bonds;
(d) to cut oil supplies to Egypt;
(e) to ban commercial exchanges with Egyptian public and pri-
vate establishments which deal with Israel;
(f) to call for an economic boycott against all Egyptian individu-
als and institutions which deal with Israel.
Although the resolutions were adopted unanimously, the adoption
came only after extensive and bitter debate among the members present.
Saudi Arabia and its supporters favored less drastic resolutions; the PLO,
Iraq and Syria were the leaders of the hard line policy. The Sudan,
Somalia, Oman and Yemen elected to maintain diplomatic relations with
Egypt after the sixteen other members of the Arab League had broken
relations with Egypt." 5
Some members of the Arab League (particularly Saudi Arabia) had
been extending substantial economic assistance to Egypt, amounting to
approximately $1 billion a year. 116 It was not immediately clear 17
basis bearing interest generally at market rates, the Senate Report (Id. at 5-6) stressed the
concern of the committee that the great problems facing the economies of Egypt and Israel
could affect the abilities of these countries to repay the loans at the rates required by the
legislation. The Committee insisted on adding the following clause to Section 3 of the Spe-
cial International Security Assistance Act of 1979:
[I]t may become necessary to modify the terms of the loans authorized under the
provisions of this act for the Governments of Israel and Egypt in future years.
"I ECONOMIST, supra note 39.
115 N.Y. Times, May 1, 1979, at 3, col. 1.
116 Hearings on Middle East Peace Package, supra note 19, at 43.
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whether the sanctions against economic aid would apply to pre-existing
commitments by Arab states to Israel; but as events developed, it became
clear that they will be so applied, and that prior existing obligations will
not necessarily be honored."l '
V. EFFECTS OF THE PEACE TREATY ON TRADE
Some of the immediate effects of the Peace Treaty on trade between
the Middle East and the United States may be identified. At the outset,
the Treaty should probably be viewed as giving greater stability to the
entire area."'9 However, any analysis of this broad subject requires a sepa-
rate inquiry into the short term effects on the trade between the United
States and Egypt, the United States and Israel, and the United States
and other Middle Eastern countries. The phrase short term describes the
period between the signing of the Treaty and the date on which Egyp-
tian-Israeli negotiations over the status of the Gaza Strip, the West Bank,
and Jerusalem are completed or broken off. Perhaps the phrase short
term should be extended to the date when it becomes clear whether the
negotiated settlement is acceptable to either all or most of the other Mid-
dle Eastern countries.
A. Trade With Middle East Countries (Other Than Egypt and Israel)
Let us look first at the question of trade between the United States
and the Middle Eastern countries other than Egypt and Israel. The
Treaty seems to have resulted in a much greater unity among Arab
League countries (excluding Egypt) than existed previously, and a wors-
ening of the relationships (at least temporarily) between the moderate
Arab states (such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait) and the United States."'
The Treaty also seems to have resulted in an entirely new relationship;
almost all Arab countries are now not only opposed to Israel but equally
opposed to Egypt. Note also that one of the resolutions proposed by Yasir
11 Id. at 39. At the hearings on the Middle East Peace Package, former Secretary of
State Vance testified that "the indications are that the Baghdad participants would intend
to carry out prior existing obligations."
"0 Saudi Arabia had promised in 1978 to finance the purchase by Egypt of 50 F-5 E
'Tiger planes from the United States but indications seem to be that Saudi Arabia will not
go through with this promise, N.Y. Times, May 22, 1979, at 3, col. 3.
"1' Former Secretary of State Vance testified, supra note 102, at 29-30, in regard to the
Middle East Peace Package:
The fact that Israel and Egypt have agreed to live in peace . . . and to establish
normal relations. . . is a major step in changing the situation in that region. It is
very hard to contemplate any conflict that could take place between Arab and
Israel if Egypt were not a party to that conflict. . . . [I]t will thus lead to greater
stability in the area.
2I Secretary of State Vance told Congress that American relations with Saudi Arabia
had deteriorated because of "clear and sharp differences" over the Egyptian-Israeli peace
treaty. N.Y. Times, May 10, 1979, at 1, col. 1.
Vol. 12:27
EFFECTS OF PEACE ON U.S. TRADE
Arafat at the Baghdad meeting called for an oil, trade and financial boy-
cott against the United States. 121 This proposal was rejected.
In the short run, the Treaty of Peace probably will have little posi-
tive effect on the economies of the Middle Eastern countries, other than
Egypt and Israel, unless a solution to the Palestinian problem acceptable
to these Middle Eastern countries is developed. At the present time, it is
not possible to say what solution (if any) will eventually be worked out.
As previously noted,122 Egypt and Israel have agreed "to negotiate contin-
uously and in good faith," to achieve a comprehensive peace settlement in
accordance with a "Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at
Camp David," regarding those provisions of the Framework which relate
to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The parties set themselves the goal
of completing the negotiations within one year. 23 The negotiations
started in the latter part of May, 1979 but progress has been very slow.
Until these negotiations are finished, trade between the United States
and the Middle East countries other than Egypt and Israel probably will
not be substantially affected by the Treaty of Peace. 24
The effects of the Peace Treaty and the related U.S. commitment 25
will certainly have a positive effect, even in the short run, on trade be-
tween the United States, Egypt and Israel.
B. Trade With Egypt
In the long run, the economy of Egypt will benefit substantially from
III N.Y. Times, April 1, 1979, at 8, col. 2.
122 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS, supra note 1 at 530. This undertaking is contained, not in
the Treaty of Peace or its annexes, but in the joint letter of March 26, 1979 to President
Carter from President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin.
123 Id.
12 Critics in the United States of the Treaty of Peace might be tempted to claim that
OPEC's two substantial increases in the price of oil, which occurred in March and June,
1979, were motivated in part by a desire to retaliate against the United States for its leading
supportive role in the negotiation of the Treaty of Peace. There seems to be no basis on
which to make such a claim. The text of the OPEC Communique on Oil at the end of the
ministerial meeting in Geneva on June 28, 1979 makes no inference to any such connection.
N.Y. Times, April 29, 1979, at D-4. The price increases applied to all sales whether to the
United States or to others, and were agreed to by all OPEC members. The motivation for
the increase appears to have been the general shortage of oil supplies caused by the reduced
oil production by Iran.
125 The Carter Administration has encouraged other industrialized countries to assist in
economic aid to Israel and Egypt but it is not certain what part other governments may play
in assisting Egypt and Israel after the Peace Treaty. President Sadat is hopeful that Ger-
many and Japan will increase assistance at this time, and the World Bank is considering an
increase in aid to Egypt from $200 million to $300 million per year. See Hearings on Middle
East Peace Package, supra note 102, at 64-65 (statement of Joseph C. Wheeler, AID Asst.
Administrator).
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a reduction in military expenditures and a redeployment of expenditures
from the military and nonproductive areas to the development of its
economy. In the short run, however, Egypt believes that it must keep its
military expenditures at a high level because, as former Secretary of State
Vance testified, "both Egypt and Israel are taking steps into the un-
known."12 Thus, in the short run, trade between Egypt and the United
States probably will be affected in the following ways:
(1) The additional military and economic aid which Egypt will be
receiving from the United States will probably result in some increase in
American exports to Egypt127 over the next three years. The increase in
aid will amount to approximately $0.6 billion per year for the next three
years. 1
28
(2) Apart from the effect of this additional military and economic
aid package, the goodwill engendered by the United States in supporting
the negotiation of the Peace Treaty will have, at least in the short term, a
role of some importance in expanding U.S. exports to Egypt.
(3) U.S. trade with Egypt will increase to some extent yet undeter-
mined, since products of American companies previously on the Egyptian
boycott blacklist will apparently be welcome once more in Egypt.129 For
example, it was announced recently that after an absence of more than
ten years, Coca Cola will again be available in Egypt.2 0
(4) In January of this year, the U.S. Department of Commerce took
the position that an Egypt-Israel peace settlement (in addition to provid-
ing greater financial resources for economic development in Egypt and
Israel) would give rise to opportunities for trade and economic coopera-
tion between Israel and Egypt which, in turn, might result in additional
sales and investment by American companies in the areas of communica-
tions, transportation, agriculture, tourism, and energy. 1 ' This may indeed
prove true in the long run; but, until an overall Mideast peace is estab-
lished, prospects for any substantial increase in U.S. exports to Egypt as
a result of these factors seem somewhat remote.1
3 2
128 Id. at 15.
127 In general, funds made available for aid to a foreign country may be used for pro-
curement outside the United States only if the President makes certain determinations. 22
U.S.C. § 2354 (1972).
,28 Important portions of the military assistance will be provided by the United States
military forces out of its existing inventories. For example, a proposed sale of a $594 million
of planes and missiles from U.S. Air Force inventories has already been announced. Wall St.
J., July 9, 1979, at 14, col. 1.
129 MIDDLE EAST ECON. DIG., supra note 94.
130 Id.
131 Keim, Major Events Affect Prospects in Near East, North Africa, Bus. AM. 27 (Jan.
29, 1979), reprinted in DEP'T OF COM., OvgamsAs Bus. RPT. O.B.R. No. 79-9, at 79, (Apr.
1979).
12 Looking back on the five years following the end of World War II there were few
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(5) U.S. tourist trade to Egypt may increase as a result of the peace,
and this in turn may result in some increase in U.S. imports from Egypt.
(6) Prior to the signing of the Peace Treaty, Israel had required
that the following clause appear on bills of lading:
133
This vessel is not to call at or enter the territorial waters of any Egyp-
tian, Yemeni, Jordanian, Saudi Arabian, Iraqi, Lebanese, or Syrian port
(or Kuwaiti port) prior to unloading in Israel unless the ship is in dis-
tress or subject to force majeure. Transshipment is permitted.
Paragraph 7 of Article 6 of Annex III to the Treaty, Protocol Concerning
Relations of the Parties, provides that access to the ports of each party
shall be granted "on the same conditions generally applicable to vessels
and cargoes of other nations." 34 This clause is to be operative "upon
completion of the interim withdrawal." The removal of "Egyptian" from
the Israeli bill of lading clause (which would be required by Article 6 (7))
would facilitate shipping both to Egypt and to Israel because ships calling
on Israeli ports would also be free to call upon Egyptian ports, and might,
in the long run, provide better service and/or lower freight rates.
(7) The reductions in economic aid from other Arab countries to
Egypt could well have a substantially adverse effect on trade with the
United States since the Egyptian government will have less foreign ex-
change for imports. 35 However the Egyptian economy will benefit from
the oil produced at the Israeli-developed off-shore oil wells in the Gulf of
Suez which are to be handed over to Egypt in connection with Israel's
withdrawal from the Sinai.1"8 Furthermore, the return of the Sinai Penin-
sula to Egypt is expected to result in much greater exploratory efforts in
that area.1 37 These benefits may serve to partially offset any losses in for-
eign assistance.
The Arab countries other than Egypt may seek to increase their own
military forces to compensate for a possible lack of Egyptian support. If a
solution to the Palestinian problem is reached between Egypt and Israel
that is not satisfactory to the Palestinians or to other Arab countries, it is
difficult to estimate the effect upon trade between the United States and
the other'Arab countries; but the result could well be adverse.
Jananese or German tourists in the United States. Of course, the Egyptian-Israeli situation
is not precisely analogous.
M Marketing in Israel, U.S. DEP'T oF COM., OvERSEAs Bus. REPT., OBR No. 39, at 12
(Aug. 1977).
134 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS, supra note 1, at 391.
5 Hearings on Middle East Peace Package, supra note 19, at 25.
136 ECONOMIST, supra note 38. It has been estimated that perhaps 30,000 barrels per
day, about twenty percent of Israel's current requirement of oil, is produced at these fields.
137 Wall St. J., July 9, 1979, at. 14, col. 1.
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C. Trade with Israel
To be prepared for unknown contingencies, Israel, like Egypt, must
keep military expenditures at a high level. However, the costs of peace in
the case of Israel are far worse than in the case of Egypt. Under the Peace
Treaty, Israel is required to withdraw from all of its military installations
in the Sinai, including the major military air bases it has constructed in
the Sinai. s13 The U.S. Secretary of Defense estimated the cost of these
withdrawals at between $3 billion and $4 billion. 39 The Israeli estimate is
from $4 to $5 billion. 40 U.S. aid will cover about $3.0 billion of this
amount, leaving possible incremental expenditures of between $1 billion
and $2 billion. Thus although Israel, as a result of the conclusion of the
Peace Treaty, will cancel much of the previously planned expansion of its
armed forces,"" its future military budget will remain high until a stable,
peaceful settlement throughout the Middle East is achieved.
The short run effects of the Treaty of Peace on trade between Israel
and the United States may therefore be summarized as follows:
(1) The additional military aid package described above will surely
result in substantial U.S. exports to Israel. The U.S. Air Force will be the
project manager for the two new bases to be constructed in the Negev,
and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers will be the construction agent. Of
the total $3 billion in U.S. aid, $0.8 billion will be made available through
grant-aids of defense articles and services. 42 U.S. construction firms will
be the principal contractors for the air base construction jobs. 143
(2) Treaty provisions relating to the Suez Canal, the Strait of Tiran
and the Gulf of Aquaba, especially the provisions assuring that Israeli
ships and cargoes destined for or coming from Israel shall enjoy the right
of free passage through the Suez Canal and its approaches, should be of
substantial benefit to U.S trade with Israel in reducing costs and cutting
shipping time. Note that these rights became operative as soon as the
Treaty ratification instruments were exchanged. 44
(3) U.S. Defense Secretary Brown's letter to Israeli Defense Minis-
ter Weizman 15 stated that in addition to the assistance that the Presi-
"' There are four such fields; forward operating bases at Refidim and Ophir, and main
operating bases at Etam and Etzion. See Hearings on Middle East Peace Package, supra
note 102, at 24 (statement of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown).
139 Id.
14 Id. at 21.
141 Id. at 25.
142 Military grant-aid shipments are not included in the principal Census trade totals
but are listed under Other Census totals.
143 Hearing on Middle East Peace Package, supra note 19, at 46.
144 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS, supra note 1, at 365, 391.
145 Hearings on Middle East Peace Package, supra note 19, at 180-81.
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dent was prepared to recommend to Congress, Secretary Brown also was
prepared to enter into a memorandum of agreement with former Defense
Minister Weizman for cooperative research and development and military
procurement. The agreement would provide for increased research and
development exchange between the two countries and for removal of bar-
riers to competitive bidding by Israeli industries in the U.S. Defense mar-
ket. In 1978, Israel's exports of arms amounted to $500 million, and in
1979 Defense Minister Weizman indicated that they are expected to rise
to $600 million.146
(4) Prior to the signing of the Peace Treaty, Israel claimed that it
had negotiated a relaxation of the tight U.S. restrictions on the export of
Israeli-made weapons containing American components to other coun-
tries. Israeli arms exports could be substantially increased by this relaxa-
tion of controls.14 7 There is no explicit statement in Secretary Brown's
letter or in his testimony before the Committee at the open hearings as to
any relaxation of re-export provisions. However, it would, perhaps, not be
abnormal to include such a provision in the proposed agreement.
(5) The delivery of the off-shore oilfields in the Gulf of Suez to
Egypt will increase Israel's oil imports by placing a further call on its
foreign exchange requirements, thus adversely affecting the amount of
other imports.
(6) Israeli exports to Egypt may well increase under the Treaty and
the agreement on trade and commerce which is to be negotiated. 148 Any
such increase in Israeli exports would increase its ability to import from
other nations. It is difficult, however, to estimate how much of an increase
in Israeli exports to Egypt can be expected and within what period. As
previously noted,14 9 Article 2 of Annex III to the Treaty becomes effective
only upon completion of the interim withdrawal, and it is quite possible
that no substantial increase in trade between the two countries will occur
until an agreement on trade and commerce is reached.
(7) The present high rate of inflation in Israel 5 may well be in-
creased as a result of the military relocations from the Sinai despite
Israel's efforts to insulate its economy from the shock. A further sharp
increase in the rate of inflation could adversely affect the Israeli economy
and its import and export trade.
148 Crittenden, Israel's Economic Plight, 57 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1008, (1979).
147 ECONOMIST, Mar. 24, 1979, at 67.
48 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS, supra note 1, at 362.
149 Id.
1o The official Israeli government estimate of inflation for 1979 is 80 percent; unoffi-
cially, it is estimated at 110%. ECONOMIST, July 28, 1979, at 12.
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VI. LONG TERM EFFECTS OF THE TREATY ON TRADE BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND THE MIDDLE EAST
Obviously, this is a much more complicated and conjectural subject
than the short run effects. Any attempt to answer this question would
necessitate making certain predictions as to the vital negotiations now
under way in regard to the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and Jerusalem.
These predictions could include the following:
(A) the negotiations between Egypt and Israel are completely un-
successful and are broken off finally and completely, with the following
alternative results:
(1) Both Egypt and Israel denounce the Treaty of Peace; or
(2) The Treaty of Peace continues in effect and all parts of the
Treaty and annexes are completely carried out.' 5'
(B) That negotiations between Egypt and Israel are completely suc-
cessful as between them, and all parts of the Treaty and Annexes are
completely carried out. The following alternatives with respect to the
other Middle Eastern countries would need to be considered:
(1) The settlement negotiated between Egypt and Israel is ac-
ceptable to all of the other Middle Eastern countries;
(2) The settlement negotiated between Egypt and Israel is ac-
ceptable to none of the other Middle Eastern countries; or
(3) The settlement negotiated between Egypt and Israel is ac-
ceptable to some of the Middle Eastern countries but not accept-
able to the hard line countries.
Each of these various alternatives in turn would need to be analyzed as to
the degree of acceptability and nonacceptability and the long range ac-
tions taken by each country in regard to Egypt or Israel. A detailed exam-
ination of the various possibilities does not seem profitable at this stage.
If a solution to the Palestinian problem is found that is acceptable to
Israel, Egypt and the other Arab countries, a broader peace can be envis-
aged with more favorable consequences for U.S. trade with the Middle
East than can be envisaged under the present Treaty. Not only would
U.S.-Middle East trade be expanded, but undoubtedly there also would
be a fairly sharp reduction in U.S. exports of arms to that area. However,
if the negotiations called for under the Treaty do not result in a Palestin-
"' There seem to be no specific provisions of the Treaty of Peace requiring cancellation
of the Treaty should the negotiations over the Palestinian problem be unsuccessful. How-
ever, it is undoubtedly an issue of great intensity between Egypt and Israel. At the open
hearings on the Middle East Peace Package there apparently was no suggestion that the
Treaty would be abrogated if the negotiations were not successful. However, the successful
negotiation of this issue is considered by some to be a sine qua non of the Peace Treaty's
continuing effect. ECONOMIST, supra note 4, at 61-62, cols. 2, 3.
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ian solution acceptable to the Arab countries generally, U.S. trade with
those Arab countries not willing to accept the negotiated solution could
well be adversely affected. One can only hope that the present Treaty,
which is at least a first step in the direction of a broad settlement of
Middle Eastern problems, will eventually bear fruit in the difficult negoti-
ations to come, yielding a solution acceptable to most if not all of the
parties concerned.1 52
151 This article's coverage is through December 1, 1979.

